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Reserve System.WHY THE COMPOSITE INDEX OF LEADING INDICATORS DOESN'T LEAD
EVAN F. KOENIG AND KENNETH M. EMERY'
ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the real-time performance of the
Commerce Department's composite index of leading indicators. We
find that the composite leading index has failed to provide reliable
advance warning of cyclical turning points. One reason for this
failure is that the leading index's transition from expansion to
contraction is generally not very sharp. Consequently, cyclical
peaks in the index are difficult to discern in real time. While
transitions from contraction to expansion are sharp on average,
cyclical troughs in the leading index often precede cyclical troughs
in the economy by only a few months. Consequently, even timely
recognition of troughs in the leading index fails to provide advance
warning of turnarounds in the general level of economic activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among all the indexes designed to give advance warning of business-cycle
turning points, the Commerce Department's composite index of leading economic
indicators (ClI) stands out as by far the most widely publicized.' In the
popular press, it is touted as "the Government's main economic forecasting
gauge" (New York Times, June 1, 1991, section 1, page 1), and is said to
"forecast the economy over six to nine months" (New York Times, November 2,
1991, section 1, page 49). When plotted against time the CLI does, indeed,
seem to change direction well in advance of the economy's cyclical peaks andtroughs (Figure 1). The lead time for cyclical peaks ranges from one month to
twenty months and averages 8.2 months. At cyclical troughs, the lead time
ranges between one month and ten months and averages 4.2 months.
There are reasons, however, to believe that such plots and figures
exaggerate the forecasting performance of the CLIo First, the ClI is released
with a full one-month delay. The ClI for July 1992, for example, was not
released until September 1. More significantly, cyclical peaks and troughs in
the ClI are often not easily recognized as such until well after the fact. In
a period during which the ClI has been expanding, it is difficult to tell (in
real time) whether a decline in the most recent month's value of the ClI is an
isolated event or the beginning of a new trend (Hymans 1973). Finally, the
data and procedures used to construct the ClI are subject to revision. Data
revisions are frequent but, ordinarily, have a relatively small impact on the
index. In contrast, revisions to the procedures used to construct the ClI
have sometimes altered the behavior of the index quite significantly.2
Figure 2, for example, shows three plots of the time-path of the ClI, each
covering the period from October 1972 through October 1973. Plot A shows the
ClI path as it appeared in November 1973, at the start of the 1973-1975
recession. Plot B shows the behavior of the index as it appeared in March
1975, following a series of data revisions and just prior to a major
methodological revision. Finally, plot C shows the behavior of the index as
it appears today, reflecting revisions to both data and methodology. In
today's data, the cyclical peak of the Cli occurs in March 1973, eight months
prior to the business-cycle peak. In the real-time data, on the other hand,
the only indications that a recession is on the way come from one-month pauses
in ClI growth during April and September. Arguably, the performance of the
2ClI in real time (before revisions) gives a more accurate picture of the
advance warning we can expect to receive from the ClI in the future than does
the performance of a version of the ClI that incorporates twenty years of
hindsight.
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This paper begins with a review of the real-time forecasting performance
of the composite leading indicators. Using a sophisticated, Bayesian
methodology to signal turning points in the ClI, we show that the index has
failed to provide reliable advance warning of both recessions and recoveries.
In particular, by the time the ClI gives clear warning of a recession, the
recession is usually well underway.
A first step in improving the forecasting performance of the ClI is
understanding why the current version of the index fails to perform better.
Toward this end, we examine more closely the behavior of the ClI over the
course of the business cycle. We find that the ClI--unlike coincident
measures of economic activity--typically declines much more slowly in the
early months of its contraction phase than in the later months of its
contraction phase. As a result, the transition from the expansion phase of
the ClI to the contraction phase is often not sharp or distinct, making it
difficult to recognize cyclical peaks in the leading index until well after
the fact. Transitions from contraction to expansion are, on average, sharp,
but cyclical troughs in the leading index often precede cyclical troughs in
the economy by only a few months, so that even timely recognition of troughs
in the leading index fails to provide advance warning of turnarounds in the
general level of economic activity.
As a test of our hypothesis that the roundedness of ClI peaks helps
explain why it is so difficult to obtain advance warning of recessions, we run
3regressions of the recognition lag at ClI turning points against alternative
measures of roundedness. Results confirm that the rate of growth in the ClI
in the months immediately following a ClI turning point are an important
determinant of how quickly that turning point will be recognized as such.
We close with some observations on the policy implications of our
results. In particular, we note that forecasters should be very cautious
about retracting recession warnings once they have been issued. Furthermore,
we argue that the forecasting performance of the ClI would be improved if, in
evaluating series for inclusion in the leading index, greater weight was
placed on the sharpness of the series' cyclical turning points.
II. HOW WEll DO THE lEADING INDICATORS PERFORM?
A. Recognizing Turning Points in the leading Indicators
Some method for recognizing turning points in the ClI is required
before the index can be used to signal recessions and recoveries. The
preferred method for recognizing turning points in the leading index is based
on a Bayesian updating formula derived by Neftci (19B2) and modified by
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989). Previous research has shown that the Bayesian
approach performs better than simple rules of thumb--rules such as those which
signal a recession following three consecutive declines in the ClI and a
recovery following three consecutive increases (Koenig and Emery 1991, Diebold
and Rudebusch 1989, 1991).
The mechanics of the Bayesian approach can be summarized as follows. In
any month that the ClI reaches a cyclical trough, the probability that the ClI
4is in its contraction phase (indicating that the economy is soon to slip into
recession) is set equal to zero. 4 In subsequent months, the probability that
the ClI is in its contraction phase is updated. The evidence-gathering pro-
cess is cumulative: the probability that the ClI is in its contraction phase
in the current month is an increasing function of the probability that the ClI
was in its contraction phase during the previous month. The probability that
the ClI is in its contraction phase in the current month is also a function of
this month's change in the ClI: the larger the decrease (smaller the increase)
in the index, the greater is the probability that the ClI is in its contrac-
tion phase. Finally, the probability that the ClI is in its contraction phase
in the current month is an increasing function of the number of past
contraction phases relative to the cumulative length of past expansion phases:
if transitions from expansion to contraction have been rare in the past, the
updating formula assumes that they probably will also be rare in the future.
More precisely, the formula for the probability of recession is
(I) Pt = [Pt-, + Pl (I - Pt-,)] Fdt!{[Pt_, + Pl (I - PH)] Fdt
+ (I - Pt_,)(l - Pl) Fut),
where Pt is the estimated probability that the composite index of leading
indicators is in its contraction phase at time t, so a recession is imminent:
Pl is the a priori probability that the ClI has entered its contraction phase,
given that a month earlier the ClI was in its expansion phase; and Fd t and FUt
are the likelihoods that the latest change in the ClI came from the contrac-
tion phase of the index and the expansion phase of the index, respectively.5
Once it has been determined that the economy is in recession, a modified
5version of equation 1 can be used to calculate the probability that an
expansion is imminent. This is done by switching Fdt and FUt and by replacing
Pl with the a priori probability that the ClI has entered its expansion phase,
given that a month earlier the ClI was in its contraction phase.
B. The ClI as a Predictor of Business-Cycle Turning Points
Figure 3 plots the probability of imminent recession (during periods when
the economy was expanding) and the probability of imminent expansion (during
periods when the economy was contracting) obtained by applying equation 1 to
real-time, unrevised data.6 The use of unrevised data is necessary in order
to obtain an accurate assessment of the historical forecasting performance of
the CLIo This real-time historical performance is likely to be a more accur-
ate gUide to the future forecasting ability of the ClI than is an analysis
based only upon the latest version of the ClI, since the latest version of the
ClI has been fine-tuned with an eye toward fitting the historical data.
Figure 3 shows that the probability of imminent recession was at or
above 90 percent--a commonly used critical value--at the start of only one of
the past five recessions. Reducing the critical value to 70 percent would
have given advance warning of one additional recession (that beginning in
1981), but would also have resulted in a series of false recession-warnings
during 1984. Similarly, using a 90-percent critical value, the ClI gave
advance indication of only one of the past five recoveries and gave several
false recovery signals in the middle of the 1973-75 recession. lowering the
critical value to 70 percent would not have given advance indication of any
additional recoveries (though it would have provided a coincident signal of
the 1980 recovery).
6Figure 4 provides alternative documentation of the inability of the ell
to provide advance warning of business-cycle peaks. Two alternative signaling
rules are examined. Under both rules, the analyst issues a recession warning
whenever the probability of recession exceeds a specified critical value
(either 70 percent or gO percent). Under rule A, the warning is retracted as
soon as the probability drops below the critical value. Under rule B, in
contrast, the warning remains in force until it is either proven valid (the
economy goes into recession) or until it is proven invalid. A recession
signal is proven invalid if the ClI exceeds its previous high without a
recession having developed. Under either rule, a signal is said to be "false"
if it arrives while the ClI and the economy are both in their expansion
phases. The rules were applied to real-time and final-revised data.
For each signaling rule and critical value, Figure 4 gives the total
number of months in which false recession warnings were issued and the average
lag (again measured in months) with which valid recession warnings followed
business-cycle peaks.? Notice that for each rule, lowering the critical
value yields more timely warning of recessions, at the expense of additional
false signals. For instance, when rule B is applied to real-time data with a
gO-percent critical value, a valid warning would have come, on average, 3.2
months after each recession had actually begun. There would have been no
false recession signals. With a 70-percent critical value, the same rule
would have issued a valid recession warning that arrived 1.6 months late, on
average, with a total of eight false signals.
Several features of the results displayed in Figure 4 are noteworthy.
First, none of the signaling rules provide reliable advance warning of
recessions. Second, the performance of a signaling rule applied to final-
7revised data is a very poor guide to how that rule would have performed in
real time. Not only does the use of final-revised data understate the lag
with which any given rule would have signaled recessions, it also changes the
ranking of alternative rules. Thus, when applied to final-revised data, rule
A is clearly superior to rule B. On the other hand, when applied to real-time
data, rule B appears to have the advantage. The latter result suggests that
once analysts issue a recession warning, they should not retract the warning
until the ClI begins to set new highs.
Figure 5 is similar to Figure 4, except it documents the inability of
the ClI to provide advance warning of business-cycle troughs, rather than the
ClI's inability to warn of business-cycle peaks. Again, two alternative
signaling rules are examined--rules analogous to those analyzed in Figure 4.
Under both rules, the analyst issues a recovery warning whenever the
probability of recovery exceeds a specified critical value. Under rule A, the
warning is retracted as soon as the probability drops below the critical
value. Under rule B, the warning remains in force until either the economy
begins to expand or the signal is proven invalid. A recovery signal is proven
invalid if the ClI reaches a new cyclical minimum without a recovery having
developed. Under either rule, a signal is said to be "false" if it arrives
while the ClI and the economy are both in their contraction phases. As in
Figure 4, the rules were applied to real-time and final-revised data.
In comparing rules for signaling the beginning of recoveries, just as in
comparing rules for signaling recessions, results obtained using final-revised
data are misleading. Thus, as shown in Figure 5, the final-revised data
suggest that the risk of false signals is negligible even with a 70-percent
critical value. Using real-time data, false signals are apparent at both the
8lO-percent and the 90-percent critical values, and a tradeoff between false
signals and the timeliness of recovery signals is revealed. Furthermore,
while the final-revised data indicate that rule B is preferable to rule A, the
ranking of the signaling rules is reversed when the rules are applied to real-
time data. Thus, in predicting recoveries, unlike predicting recessions,
analysts should retract their warnings as soon as the probability that the ClI
has entered a new phase falls below the chosen critical value.
III. WHAT MAKES TURNING POINTS SO DIFFICULT TO PREDICT?
That the ClI should provide, at best, coincident warning of business-
cycle troughs is, perhaps, not surprising, given that the average gap between
ClI troughs and business-cycle troughs is only four months. More troubling is
the ClI's failure to signal recessions until several months after they have
begun. After all, ClI peaks precede business-cycle peaks by over eight
months, on average. What makes recognizing ClI peaks so difficult? In this
section, we establish that ClI peaks are significantly more rounded than are
ClI troughs, and that this roundedness contributes to the inability of the ClI
to provide advance warning of recessions.
A. Round Peaks and Sharp Troughs
Sichel (1992) has shown that output growth is particularly rapid in the
early stages of recoveries. Consequently, business-cycle troughs are
"sharper" than are business-cycle peaks. Since the ClI is designed to provide
an advance view of movements in economic activity, one might also expect
9cyclical peaks in the CLI to be more rounded than cyclical troughs. To
formally test this proposition, we divided each CLI expansion phase and each
ClI contraction phase into three equal segments.s We then calculated the
mean growth rate of the CLI within each segment, and tested whether growth
rates were constant across segments. For comparison, we undertook similar
calculations for the Commerce Department's composite coincident index--a broad
monthly measure of real economic activity.9
As shown in Figure 6, we found a systematic tendency for CLI growth to
be higher in the first stage of its expansion than in the later stages of its
expansion. Indeed, this tendency is even more pronounced for the CLI than it
is for coincident measures of real economic activity. Furthermore, the ClI--
unlike the coincident indicators--declines less rapidly in the first stage of
contractions than in the later stages of contractions. Chi-square tests
establish that these differences in growth rates across expansion and
contraction stages are statistically significant. 10 11 Summarizing, peaks
in the CLI are even more rounded, relative to troughs, than are peaks in real
economic activity. Not only is ClI growth unusually rapid immediately after
troughs in the index, ClI growth is unusually slow immediately after peaks.
B. Roundedness and the Timeliness of Recession Warnings
As a test of whether the roundedness of ClI peaks helps explain why it
is so difficult to obtain advance warning of recessions, we ran regressions of
the recognition lag at CLI peaks (measured in months) against alternative
measures of roundedness. Recognition lags were obtained by applying signaling
rules A and B (as defined in Section II) to data extending back to 1948,
capturing a total of nine ClI peaks. Using a 70-percent critical value, rule
10Ayielded longer recognition lags than rule B at two of these peaks (December
1955 and June 1959), so separate sets of regressions were run for each rule.
(Using a 90-percent critical value, rules A and B generated identical lags, so
only one set of regressions was required.) Roundedness was measured by
calculating the percentage change in the ClI in the months just prior to and
just following each ClI peak. The larger the pre-peak percentage increase and
post-peak percentage decline in the index, the sharper the transition between
the ClI-expansion and contraction phases. Two alternative growth horizons
were tried: a three-month horizon and a six-month horizon. Regression
results are displayed in Table 1. 12
In the six regressions that include both the pre-peak increase and post-
peak decline in the ClI, the estimated coefficient of the pre-peak increase is
invariably small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The
coefficient attached to the post-peak decline is, in contrast, consistently
large in magnitude and often significant at the ten-percent level. When the
pre-peak increase is dropped from the regressions, the magnitude of the
coefficient attached to the post-peak decline is, in every case, virtually
unaffected. Furthermore, marginal significance levels fall. Indeed, with the
1948 ClI peak included in the sample, the coefficient attached to the post-
peak decline is always significant at the ten-percent level, and usually
significant at the five-percent level. Considering the small size of our
sample (only nine observations), these results are quite striking.
Apparently, then, the time needed to recognize a cyclical peak in the
ell is completely independent of how rapidly the leading index grows in the
months just prior to that peak. In contrast, there is substantial evidence
that the more slowly the leading index declines in the months immediately
11following a peak, the longer the delay with which that peak will be recog-
nized. Using a six-month growth horizon, variations in post-peak growth
explain anywhere from one third to one half of the variation in the recog-
nition lag. Each percentage-point increase in the post-peak decline subtracts
a month from the delay with which a recession warning is issued (Figure 7).
It is worth emphasizing that the difficulties that the roundedness of
ClI peaks creates for the Bayesian methodology are not limited to that
methodology alone. The timeliness of any technique for translating movements
in the ClI into recession signals will suffer due to this roundedness.
The importance of the roundedness of ClI peaks in influencing the
timeliness of recession warnings appears to have been overlooked by the
Commerce Department in its selection of series to include in the leading
index. Although "cyclical conformity" is one of the criterion used to select
the components of the ClI, the definition of cyclical conformity excludes any
measure of how rapidly a series declines in the months that our analysis
suggests are critical--namely, those months immediately following the series'
cyclical peaks. In the Commerce Department criteria, the closest thing to a
measure of roundedness is the average rate of decline of series over entire
peak-to-trough intervals (Hertzberg and Beckman 1989).
C. Roundedness and the Timeliness of Expansion Signals
We have established that cyclical troughs in the ClI are much sharper,
on average, than are cyclical peaks. We have also shown that the ClI peaks
that are most difficult to recognize are those that are followed by the
smallest declines in the CLIo This result suggests that the relative
roundedness of ClI peaks may account for the long time it typically takes to
12recognize ClI peaks as compared to ClI troughs. To shed further light on the
relationship between roundedness and the recognition lag at cyclical turning
points, we repeated the regressions reported in Table 1, this time for ClI
troughs rather than ClI peaks. Results are presented in Table 2.
In each regression, the dependent variable is the lag with which rule A
or rule S, evaluated at either the 70-percent or the gO-percent critical
value, signals cyclical troughs in the ClI.
13 The independent variables
include measures of the rate of decline of the ClI in the months immediately
preceding a ClI trough and the rate of increase of the ClI in the months
immediately following a ClI trough. Results for both three-month and six-
month growth rates are displayed.
As in Table 1, the growth rate of the ClI in the months preceding a
turning point appears not to have any effect on how many months it takes to
recognize that a turning point has occurred. Thus, in every regression, the
estimated coefficient on the pre-trough percentage decline in the ClI fails to
attain statistical significance. In contrast, the post-trough percentage
increase in the ClI is significant at the ten-percent level in fourteen of
sixteen regressions, and is often significant at better than the five-percent
level. Using a gO-percent critical value, variations in post-trough
roundedness explain between one half and three quarters of the variation in
the recognition lag. Each additional one-percentage-point increase in the ClI
during the first three-to-six months following a ClI trough subtracts a half a
month, or more, from the delay with which an expansion signal is issued.
The results presented in Table 2 confirm that the rate of growth in the
ClI during the months immediately following a ClI turning point are an
important determinant of how quickly that turning point will be recognized as
13such. Since cyclical peaks in the leading index are, on average, followed by
declines in the ClI that are very small (in magnitude) compared to the
increases in the ClI that follow troughs, it should not be surprising that it
typically takes much longer to recognize ClI peaks than it does to recognize
ClI troughs.
IV. DISCUSSION
Reading press accounts or looking at a standard time-series plot, one
can easily obtain the impression that the government's composite index of
leading indicators provides reliable advance information on the direction of
economic activity. This impression is inaccurate. Because of a one-month
publication delay, numerous revisions, and the difficulty--in real time--of
knowing whether the index has or has not reached a cyclical turning point, the
ClI provides no better than a coincident signal of recessions and expansions.
Even then, there are months in which the ClI signals that a recession or
expansion is developing when, in fact, one does not materialize.
The ClI--unlike coincident measures of economic activity--typically
declines much more slowly in the early months of its contraction phase than in
the later months of its contraction phase. As a result, the transition from
the expansion phase of the ClI to the contraction phase is often not sharp or
distinct, complicating recognition of cyclical peaks. Although there is a
shift from very low to very high average growth rates as the ClI moves from
its contraction into its expansion phase, cyclical troughs in the leading
index often precede cyclical troughs in the economy by only a few months.
Thus, even timely recognition of troughs in the leading index fails to provide
14advance warning of turnarounds in the general level of economic activity.
That the government's composite index of leading indicators has failed
to provide reliable advance warning of business-cycle turning points does not
necessarily mean that the ClI is of no use to policymakers. It may still be
the case, for example, that the ClI provides earlier information on turning
points than is available from other sources. Indeed, the failure of the ClI
to warn of business-cycle turning points may simply indicate that policymakers
are already fully utilizing the information contained in the CLIo After all,
the more successfully any leading index is used as a guide to counter-cyclical
policy, the less reliable that index will come to appear.
Finally, our results provide direction on how best to interpret
movements in the ClI as that index is currently constructed, and on how the
forecasting performance of the ClI might be improved. On the first point, our
findings suggest that once the ClI signals that a recession is about to begin
(or has already begun), the signal should not be considered invalid unless the
ClI begins to set new highs. On the second point, our findings suggest that
in evaluating series for inclusion in the ClI, as much weight should be placed
on the sharpness of the series' cyclical turning points as on the timing of
those turning points relative to turning points in economic activity.
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17TABLE 1
Roundedness of ell Peaks and the Timeliness of Recession Warnings
Recognition lag - a + b·Pre-Peak ClI Increase + c·Post-Peak ClI Decrease
Rule 1948 Peak? Growth Horizon a b c iF_
A: 70% yes 3 mo. 11.28 .05 - 3.13 .30
(.004) (.972) (.060)
yes 3 mo. 11. 32 -3.13 .40
(.001) (.040)
no 6 mo. 10.86 .04 -1.29 .25
(.097) (.972) (.246)
no 6 mo. 11.04 -1.31 .37
(.002) (.064)
yes 6 mo. 11.15 -1.38 .46
(.000) (.027)
B: 70% yes 3 mo. 7.50 1.02 -2.09 .29
(.006) (.321) (.060)
yes 3 mo. 8.32 -1.93 .27
(.001) (.086)
no 6 mo. 7.89 .09 -.79 .13
(.111) (.920) (.341)
no 6 mo. 8.28 -.85 .27
(.002) (.105)
yes 6 mo. 8.37 -.90 .37
(.001) (.050)
A&B: 90% yes 3 mo. 12.30 -.23 -2.95 .24
(.003) (.874) (.083)
yes 3 mo. 12.11 -2.99 .35
(.001) (.056)
no 6 mo. 10.60 .26 -1.07 .13
(.137) (.851) (.378)
no 6 mo. 11. 67 -1.23 .27
(.002) (.109)
yes 6 mo. 11.68 -1.24 .33
(.001) (.027)
Note: Marginal significance 1evel s appear in parantheses.
18TABLE 2
Roundedness of ell Troughs and the Timeliness of Recession Warnings
Recognition Lag = a + b·Pre-Trough ClI Decrease + c·Post-Trough ClI Increase
Rule Growth Horizon a b c iF
A: 70% 3 mo. 4.52 .22 -.65 .35
(.009) (.44) (.046)
3 mo. 4.96 -.61 .38
(.002) (.040)
6 mo. 5.09 .05 -.38 .31
(.009) (.814) (.065)
6 mo. 5.24 -.36 .40
(.002) (.040)
B: 70% 3 mo. 2.97 .21 -.37 .31
(.008) (.253) (.067)
3 mo. 3.40 -.33 .26
(.002) (.094)
6 mo. 3.03 .07 -.17 -.01
(.1ll) (.651) (.216)
6 mo. 3.24 -.15 .10
(.006) (.210)
A: 90% 3 mo. 6.69 .13 -.94 .63
(.00I) (.615) (.008)
3 mo. 6.95 -.91 .67
(.000) (.004)
6 mo. 7.31 .07 -.59 .74
(.000) (.630) (.003)
6 mo. 7.53 -.57 .77
(.000) (.001)
B: 90% 3 mo. 5.80 .21 -.84 .54
(.002) (.446) (.015)
3 mo. 6.21 -.80 .56
(.000) (.012)
19TABLE 2 Continued
6 mo. 6.37 .03 -.47 .47
(.003) (.868) (.030)
6 mo. 6.47 - .46 .54
(.001l 1.014)
Note: Marginal significance levels appear in parantheses.
20Appendix
TABLE A.I
Means of Percentage Changes in the Composite Leading and Coincident





































Chi-Square statistics for mean equality:
Leading Index
El '" £2 16.84*** El = E2 6.57***
El '" E3 34.26*** £1 = E3 15.25***
E2 = E3 3.28* £2 = £3 1.82
El == E2 = £3 34.73*** El = £2 E3 15.71***
CI = C2 4.97** CI == C2 0.75
Cl == C3 7.83*** Cl == C3 0.21
C2 == C3 1.00 C2 '" C3 0.78
Cl = C2 == C3 9.93*** Cl == C2 '" C3 0.25
E1 == C3 99.55*** El == C3 45.83***
£3 == Cl 36.93*** E3 = Cl 117.03***
*** reject null hypothesis of equality at .01 significance level
** reject null hypothesis of equality at .05 significance level
* reject null hypothesis of equality at .10 significance level
Chi-Square statistics distributed with one degree of freedom for two-stage
tests and with two degrees of freedom for three-stage tests.
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1. other prominent leading indexes include the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) experimental recession index and the
Columbia University Center for International Business-Cycle
Research (CIBCR) long-leading index.
2. Important procedural changes were made in 1969, 1975, 1979,
1982, 1983, 1987, and 1989. Detailed descriptions of these
changes can be found in the september 1969, May 1975, March 1979,
February 1983, March 1987, and January 1989 issues of the
Business Conditions Digest. Koenig and Emery (1991) present a
general description of the current version of the Commerce
Department index and an analysis of the relative importance of
data revisions and methodological revisions.
3. The CLI's extended pUblication record (the index was first
published in November 1968) gives us a long interval over which
we can evaluate the index's real-time forecasting performance.
In contrast, the NBER experimental recession index and Columbia
University's long-leading index are products of hindsight. Their
historical record is unlikely to be an accurate guide to their
future performance. In their first out-of-sample test (the 1990
recession), neither alternative index distinguished itself.
Thus, as late as November 1, 1990--over three months after the
economy's official cyclical peak--the NBER was proclaiming that
the "chances of a recession in 1990 remain low." The Columbia
University index did not register three consecutive declines (a
popular rule-of-thumb recession signal) until a release dated
June 5, 1990--only one month before the economy's official
cyclical peak. For descriptions of the NBER and Columbia
University indexes, see stock and Watson (1991, 1992) and Moore
(1991). For a discussion of the importance of using real-time
data to evaluate leading indexes, see Diebold and Rudebusch
(1991) .
4. The dates of cyclical troughs are not known until some time
after the fact. In practice, the interval between CLI troughs
and peaks is sUfficiently long that the failure to immediately
recognize a trough is of no importance.
225. Following Diebold and RUdebusch (1989), we make three
adjustments to the original Neftci paper. First, we make use of
the fact that the a priori transition probability (PL) is not, in
the real world, a function of the current length of the expansion
(Diebold and Rudebusch, 1990). In practice, then, PL is set
equal to the number of months in the past in which the CLI made
the transition from expansion to recession, divided by the total
number of months in which the CLI was expanding. Second, we
assume that changes in the CLI during its expansion and
contraction phases are normally distributed, instead of deriving
the distribution of changes in the CLI directly from historical
data. Finally, in calculating the probability that the current
CLI observation is signaling a recession, if the Neftci formula
says that the probability of a recession last month was greater
than 95 percent, we set last month's probability equal to 95
percent. This modification is meant to prevent the probability
of a recession from becoming stuck at unity.
6. The graph reflects the one-month delay with which the CLI is
released by the Commerce Department. Data start in 1968 because
the CLI was first published in November of that year.
7. These warning lags incorporate the one-month delay with which
the CLI is pUblished.
8. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, we examined
the behavior of the current version of the CLI, incorporating
revisions to both data and methodology. Consequently, our
analysis, if anything, understates the difficulty of recognizing
turning points in the leading index. By using the current
version of the leading index we avoid ambiguities that would
otherwise arise in the dating of the peaks and troughs of the
CLI. Furthermore, we are able to extend our sample back an
additional twenty years, to 1948.
9. Movements in the composite coincident index reflect movements
in industrial production, non-farm employment, real personal
income, and real manufacturing and trade sales.
10. See Table A.1 in the appendix. For further details, see
Emery and Koenig (1992).
11. Similarly, we calculated the variance of CLI growth within
each segment of the expansion and contraction phases of the
index. We found a tendency for the variance to be significantly
higher both just before and just after CLI troughs than at other
times. Real economic activity, as measured by the composite
coincident index, is more volatile just before business-cycle
troughs than at other times. See Emery and Koenig (1992) for
details.
2312. Lack of data made calculation of CLI growth over the six
months preceding the June 1948 peak impossible. consequently,
some of the regressions reported in Table 1 are based on eight
observations, others on nine observations.
13. A total of nine CLI troughs were included in the sample.
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Predicting Recessions and Expansions: Neftci Probabilities
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Predicting Expansions: Neftci Formula
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Roundedness and the Timeliness of Recession Warnings
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